SECONDARY PICKETING-THE PRUNING OF THE
TREE FRUITS EXCEPTION
On November 18, 1974, Local 1001 of the Retail Store Employees Union, Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO (the
union), initiated a strike against Safeco Title Insurance Company
(Safeco).' Earlier in the month, contract negotiations, which began
after the union was certified as the collective bargaining agent for
Safeco employees, reached a stalemate that led to a strike.' Under
union auspices, the scope of the picketing was extended to include
the picketing of five land title companies, all of which had close business ties with Safeco.' Strikers appeared on various dates between
February and April of 1975. They carried signs' and distributed
handbills which urged passersby to boycott Safeco insurance and
asked customers to cancel their policies.' The picketing was peaceful
and neither stopped work nor interfered with any deliveries to the
companies. 6
Unfair labor practices charges were filed against the union on
March 24, 1975 by the Land Title Company of Pierce County; Safeco
followed with similar charges on May 8. 7 These charges alleged that

I Retail Store Employees Local 1001 Safeco, 226 N.L.R.B. 754, 754-55 (1976), enforced,
Retail Store Employees Local 1001 v. NLRB, 99 L.R.R.M. 3330 (D.C. Cir. 1978), enforcement
denied on rehearing en banc, No. 76-2015 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 10, 1979), rev'd, 100 S. Ct. 2372
(1980). Safeco Title Insurance Company (Safeco) is a California corporation operating a title
insurance company in Seattle, Washington, id. at 754, and was an intervenor in the action.
2 Id. at 754-55.
1 Retail Store Employees Local 1001 v. NLRB, No. 76-2015, slip op. at 3 (D.C. Cir. Aug.
10, 1979) rev'd, 100 S. Ct. 2372 (1980). The five companies are: Land Title Company of Clark
County, Land Title Company of Cowlitz County, Land Title Company of Kipsap County, Land
Title Company of Pierce County, and Land Title Company of Snohomish County. All five
companies are Washington Corporations. Id. at 3 n.4.
Id. at 3. The signs read:
SAFECO NONUNION
DOES NOT EMPLOY MEMBERS OF
OR HAVE CONTRACT WITH
RETAIL STORE EMPLOYEES LOCAL 1001
id.
d Id. For the text of the handbills, see Petitioner's Brief for Review of an Order of the
NLRB at 7, Retail Store Employees Local 1001 v. NLRB, No. 76-2015 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 10,
1979) [hereinafter cited as Petitioner's Briefn.
6 Retail Store Employees Local 1001 v. NLRB, No. 76-2015, slip op. at 3 (D.C. Cir. Aug.
10, 1979), rev'd, 100 S. Ct. 2372 (1980).
7 Retail Store Employees Local 1001, 226 N.L.R.B. 754, 754 (1976), enforced, Retail Store
Employees Local 1001 v. NLRB 99 L.R.R.M. 3330 (D.C. Cir. 1978), enforcement denied on
rehearing en banc, No. 76-2015 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 10, 1979), rev'd, 100 S. Ct. 2372 (1980).
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union picketing at the premises of the land title companies constituted an illegal secondary boycott' in violation of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA or Act), 9 section 8(b)(4), subsections (i) and
(ii).Y° The parties waived intermediate proceedings and the case was
submitted directly to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or
Board) on a stipulation of the facts." The Board found that since the
predictable result of the picketing would be to force the title insur8 Retail Store Employees Local 1001 v. NLRB, No. 76-2015, slip op. at 4 (D.C. Cir. Aug.
10, 1979), rev'd, 100 S. Ct. 2372 (1980). Reference to the parties and to the type of action are
generally made in accordance with the part they play in the dispute. Since the original or
primary dispute was with Safeco, it is the primary employer. The struck product, the title
insurance, was "shipped" to the land title companies and "sold" by them. Hence, the land title
companies are the secondary employers. Picketing is termed primary when it occurs at the site
of the primary employer, and secondary when it occurs elsewhere. Product picketing or a
consumer boycott occurs when primary employees appeal to consumers to discontinue purchasing the struck product. Defined strictly, when the appeal is limited to the primary product, the
action should be termed a primary boycott. However, the terms are often used loosely, and
activity at the site of a secondary employer is often called a secondary boycott regardless of the
scope of its appeal. See Engel, Secondary Consumer Picketing-Following the Struck Product,
52 VA. L. REV. 189, 190 & nn.2 & 3 (1966).
It is the primary employer who has the power to settle the dispute, while the secondary
employer is often a neutral to the dispute and powerless to control it. See Comment, Product
Picketing: the Secondary Boycott Provisions of the NLRB and the Tree Fruits and Dow Cases,
7 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 645, 645 & nn. 2 & 3 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Comment]. For a
discussion of the neutrality doctrine, see notes 98-99 infra and accompanying text.
The secondary picketing will be illegal if it is found to be an unfair labor practice as defined
by the National Labor Relations Act. See notes 9 & 10 infra. This issue is discussed passim.
9 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976), as amended by The Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley)
Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as further amended by The Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin Act), Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959).
to29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) reads, in pertinent part:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents....
(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any per-

son . . . to engage in, a strike or a refusal . . . to use, manufacture, process, trans-

port, or otherwise, handle or work on any goods . . .or to perform any services; or
(ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce .. .where ...
an object thereof is ....

(B) forcing or requiring any person .. . to cease doing business with any other
person . . . Provided, That nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed
to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary
picketing; ....

Id. The act contained another proviso, called the publicity proviso.
Providedfurther, That . ..nothing contained in such paragraph shall be construed
to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the
public . . .that a product or products are produced by an employer with whom the
labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by another
employer. . ..

Id.
Retail Store Employees Local 1001, 226 N.L.R.B. 754, 754 (1976), enforced Retail Store
Employees Local 1001 v. NLRB, 99 L.R.R.M. 3330 (D.C. Cir. 1978), enforcement denied on
rehearing en banc, No. 76-2015 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 10, 1979), rev'd, 100 S. Ct. 2372 (1980).
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ance companies either to go out of business or to drop the primary
employer as a supplier, such action was in violation of the Act.'" It
therefore concluded that the picketing in question constituted coercion of a neutral employer within the meaning of section 8(b)(4)(ii). 13
The land title companies sold title insurance policies, which were
underwritten by Safeco under agency agreements with the companies. These policies accounted for a high percentage of each company's income, ranging from ninety to ninety-five percent. 4 The remainder of their business was derived from incidental sources such as
title research and escrow services. 15 The policies were issued in Safeco's name, signed by the president of Safeco and countersigned by an
employee of the land title company who was designated as a Safeco
officer. "b Safeco was a substantial stockholder in each of the title
companies. 7 In addition, a Safeco officer had always served as a
member of the Board of Directors and as an officer of each of the title
companies." 8 Each company established its own policy regarding
wages, hours and working conditions. No interchange of employees
between Safeco and the companies took place. 9 Nonetheless, written consent was required from Safeco, for the issuance of policies
exceeding certain limits set for each company.2"
Id.
1"Id. at 757. Because of this finding, the Board deemed it unnecessary to consider other
contentions by Safeco. Id. at 757 n.16. It was alleged that the union also violated section
8(b)(4)(i) of the Act, in that the union's picket signs contained an untrue statement and inadequately identified both the nature of the picketing, i.e., consumer picketing, and not a strike
against the land title company, and the struck product. Id. at 755.
The Board also did not consider Safeco's charge that the picketing was illegal because the
primary product had become "merged" into the business of the secondary employer. It was
alleged that this would make it impossible for a consumer to boycott the struck product without
boycotting the total business of the neutral secondary employer. Id. For a discussion of the
merged product doctrine, see notes 91-96 & 160-64 infra and accompanying text. Since the
Board avoided these issues, the scope of review by the court of appeals was limited. See Retail
Store Employees Local 1001 v. NLRB, No. 76-2015, slip op. at 5 n.13 & 23-24 n.84 (D.C. Cir.
Aug. 10, 1979), rev'd, 100 S. Ct. 2372 (1980).
'" Retail Store Employees Local 1001 v. NLRB, No. 76-2015, slip op. at 3 & nn.5 & 6 (D.C.
Cir. Aug. 10, 1979), rev'd, 100 S. Ct. 2372 (1980).
1 Retail Store Employees Local 1001, 226 N.L.R.B. 754, 755 (1976), enforced, Retail Store
Employees Local 1001 v. N.L.R.B. 99 L.R.R.M. 2330 (D.C. Cir. 1978), enforcement denied on
rehearing en banc, No. 76-2015 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 10, 1979), rev'd, 100 S. Ct. 2372 (1980).
12

16 Id.

Id. The amounts varied from 53% in one case, to from 12% to 38% in the others. Id.
IId. Two Safeco officers served on the Board of Directors of Land Title Co. of Clark
County. Id. at 755 n.4.
'" Retail Store Employees Local 1001 v. NLRB, No. 76-2015, slip op. at 4 (D.C. Cir. Aug.
10, 1979), rev'd, 100 S. Ct. 2372 (1980).
'" Id. at 3 n.5. The limits varied from $50,000 to $150,000. Retail Store Employees Local
1001, 226 N.L.R.B. 754, 755 n.3 (1976), enforced, Retail Store Employees Local 1001 v.
'7
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In a panel decision," the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia agreed with the Board's reasoning that the union had
sought a total boycott of the land title companies. Accordingly, the
court granted the Board's cross-petition for enforcement of its
order.2 This victory was short-lived, however, as a rehearing en
banc was granted, 3 and in Retail Store Employees Local 1001 v.
NLRB (Safeco),A a majority of the en banc court disagreed with the
panel decision and upheld the picketing as valid under the Act. The
Board's application for enforcement of its order was set aside.25
The court declared that the test for a finding of illegal threatening, coercing, or restraining under section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) was simply
whether the union limited its appeal to the product of the primary
employer, in this case the Safeco insurance, or whether it went
beyond this boundary to the remainder of the business of the secondary employer in general." Since the union confined its activity to
the struck insurance, the court determined that the picketing did not
constitute coercion under its interpretation of the Act.2" Although
there may, in fact, have been some coercion inherent in the potentially disastrous economic consequences for the land title companies,
the court would not consider such potential effects a determinative
factor so long as the picketing was limited to the struck product.2s
In NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union,29 a majority of the
Supreme Court reversed, stating that "[p]roduct picketing that
reasonably can be expected to threaten neutral parties with ruin or
substantial loss simply does not square with the language or the purpose of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). '
The existing guidelines in this area were by no means clear, delineating between permissible activities and actions violative of the
NLRB, 99 L.R.R.M. 3330 (D.C. Cir. 1978), enforcement denied on rehearing en banc, No.
76-2015 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 10, 1979), rev'd, 100 S. Ct. 2372 (1980).
"j Retail Store Employees Local 1001 v. NLRB, 99 L.R.R.M. 3330 (D.C. Cir. 1978), enforcement denied on rehearing en banc, No. 76-2015, (D.C. Cir. Aug. 10, 1979), rev'd, 100 S.
Ct. 2372 (1980).
2 Id. at 3331.
23 Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001 v. NLRB, 600 F.2d 280 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
No. 76-2015 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 10, 1979), rev'd, 100 S. Ct. 2372 (1980).
No. 76-2015, slip op. at 30.
Id. at 22-23, 25. The court derived this test from its interpretation of the Supreme Court
decision in NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760 (Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 58 (1974).
The Tree Fruits decision and the court of appeals' interpretation of it will be discussed passim.
r No. 76-2015, slip op. at 23-24.
2 Id. at 25-28. It was further noted that such an interpretation of the Act was necessary to
avoid "a possible confrontation" with the first amendment. Id. at 29-30.
100 S. Ct. 2372 (1980).
Ild. at 2377.
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NLRA is truly an arduous task.3 ' A brief survey of the relevant statutory material and case law is necessary to understand the problems
and complexities in this area of NLRA violations.
A major attempt at comprehensive labor legislation reform culminated with the passage of the NLRA in 1935.32 This Act was
chiefly concerned with other labor relations problems and brought
little change to the treatment accorded to secondary consumer picketing. Indeed, "[i]t was widely assumed that, prior to 1947, the NorrisLaGuardia Act prevented federal courts from enjoining any 'secondary boycotts.' "I This immunity led to abuses by unions, and in an
attempt to curtail those abuses the 8(b)(4)(A) provisions were drafted
into the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947.4 Senator Taft, in an oft quoted
statement, declared that the purpose of this section was to make "it
unlawful to resort to a secondary boycott to injure the business of a
third person who is wholly unconcerned in the disagreement between
an employer and his employees."
The broad language of the section,m however, did not satisfactorily measure up to the task of protecting the neutral secondary
employer.37 The statute forbade unions to "induce or encourage the
employees of any employer to engage in a strike or a concerted
refusal.""' This wording contained three loopholes, which unions
were able to take advantage of in order to apply pressure on the
secondary employer. First, unions could "induce" striking when it
dealt with groups that were not included in the Act's definitions of
employee or employer. Second, only requests for a "concerted refusal" were prohibited and thus, appeals to employees to act individually were permissible. Finally, the union could apply pressure to

11See, e.g., Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 386
(1969).
3 See note 9 supra.
3 Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 387 (1969).
29 U.S.C. § 141 (1976).
93 CONG. REc. 4198 (1947), reprinted in II NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABORMANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 1106 (1948).
3 The section has been called "one of the most labyrinthine provisions ever included in a
federal labor statute." Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73
HARV. L. REv. 1086, 1113 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Aaron].
31 Id. The secondary employer must in fact be found to be a neutral in the dispute and not
an ally of the primary employer if the protections of the Act are to apply. See Safeco, No.
76-2015, slip op. at 5-6. The courts have said that the Act is "limited to protecting employers in
the position of neutrals between contending parties." National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB,
386 U.S. 612, 625 (1967). For a discussion of the neutrality doctrine, see notes 98-99 infra and
accompanying text.
- Ch. 120, 61 Stat. 141 (1947).
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the secondary employer himself to terminate contacts with the primary employer, since only appeals to the "employees of any employer"
were forbidden. 39 Many legislators were dismayed over the interpretations the NLRB and the courts had given to 8(b)(4)(A). During
the debates over the 1959 amendments (Landrum-Griffin Act),40 these
individuals expressed a strong desire to close the loopholes in order
to help strengthen the Act.4"
Subsequently, under the Act as amended, the secondary picketing provisions became section 8(b)(4)(B). 42 Although this section was
designed to clarify the prohibitions on illegal secondary boycotts,
since it was a compromise between the big-business and labor forces
in Congress,43 the specific intent of the legislators remained less than
clear. The secondary picketing section prohibited certain specific actions and objectives, but could not realistically cover the multitude of
potential factual situations that might fall within its scope.44 Though
many commentators at that time assumed that the provisions condemned all secondary consumer picketing,45 the final determination
was left to the courts.
In an early NLRB decision dealing with the amended Act,
United Wholesale Employees Local 261 (Perfection Mattress &
Spring),4 the Board interpreted section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) to establish a per se prohibition against all secondary consumer picketing.47

' NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46, 51-52 (1964). See, e.g., NLRB v. International
Union of United Brewery Workers, 272 F.2d 817, 819 (10th Cir. 1959); Aaron, supra note 36,
at 1113. See generally Comment, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments: Labor's Use of the
Secondary Boycott, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 724, 726-36 (1960).
' Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959).
" See NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 64-65 (1964).
42 For the text of the Act as amended, see note 10 supra. Subsection (i) changed the 1947
Taft-Hartley Amendments by substituting "individual" and "person" for "employee" and "employer" and removing the adjective "concerted," thereby closing the first two loopholes. Subsection (ii) takes care of the third major loophole by proscribing the threatening, coercing, or
restraining of "any person," including secondary employers. See, e.g., Aaron, supra note 36, at
1114.
See Aaron, supra note 36, at 1086-89.
See Comment, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments: Labor's Use of the Secondary Boycott,
45 CORNELL L.Q. 724, 725 (1960).
4 See, e.g., Aaron, supra note 36, at 1114; Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the
National Labor Relations Act, 44 MINN. L. REV. 257, 274 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Cox];
Goldberg & Meiklejohn, Title VII: Taft-Hartley Amendments, with Emphasis on the Legislative
History, 54 Nw. U.L. REV. 747, 757-58 (1960). But see Fleming, Title VIi: The Taft-Hartley
Amendments, 54 Nw. U.L. REV. 666, 691 (1960).
129 N.L.R.B. 1014, 1020-23 (1960), rev'd by supplemental decision, 134 N.L.R.B. 931
(1961), rev'd in part sub nom., Burr v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1963).
"7For the text of the Act, see note 10 supra. The Board and courts followed a means-object
test. The test states that a violation of the statute required a finding of an unlawful means (i.e.,
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Consumer picketing at the site of a secondary employer was viewed
as necessarily inducing or encouraging employees to stop work in
violation of subsection (i). 4" Also, after an examination of the legislative history, the Board held the view that through the "wording of
the publicity proviso as well as the interpretive gloss placed thereon
by its drafters," consumer picketing was prohibited by subsection
(ii). 49 The language of this "publicity proviso" states that "publicity,
other than picketing," can be used to inform the public of a boycott. 5
The Supreme Court attempted to clear up the sections' ambiguities for the first time in NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local
760 (Tree Fruits).5 ' In this case, the Tree Fruits Labor Relations
Committee, a collective bargaining agent for twenty-one fruit packing
warehouse firms, charged the union with an unfair labor practice
under the secondary boycott provisions of the Act. 52 Initially, the
union had called a strike against the employer-members of Tree
Fruits. Subsequently, to increase the pressure on those employers,
the union also promoted a consumer boycott of Washington State apples. Pickets were then set up at forty-six Safeway stores that purchased these applies from Tree Fruits.'
Elaborate precautions were taken by the union to limit the picketing to this one product sold by the general supermarket and to
avoid any appeal to the employees of the stores to engage in a work
stoppage. 54 Patrollers were instructed to avoid picketing any employee or delivery entrance and were forbidden to make any statements which charged the stores with being unfair. Store managers
were also informed of the peaceful nature and limited objectives of
the action and were requested to contact the union for assistance if
prohibited secondary picketing), used with an unlawful purpose such as forcing a secondary
employer to cease all dealings with a primary employer. See id. at 1018. In Perfection Mattress,
the proscribed object was conceded, id. at 1019, and, according to the Board, the picketing
necessarily violated the Act. Id. at 1020-23. For further discussion of the means-object test, see
Comment, supra note 8, at 647-48.
129 N.L.R.B. at 1019-21.
4' Id. at 1023. Such picketing was in the nature of economic retaliation which coerced or
restrained the secondary employer. International Hod Carriers (Gilmore Constr. Co.), 127
N.L.R.B. 541, 545 n.6 (1960). The Board reasoned that the legislative desire to close the
loopholes of the Taft-Hartley Act compelled this prohibition. See 129 N.L.R.B. at 1022.
r For the text of the "publicity proviso," see note 10 supra.
377 U.S. 58 (1964).
52 Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760 (Tree Fruits), 132 N.L.R.B. 1172, 1172, 1174 (1961),
rev'd and remanded, Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760 v. NLRB (Tree Fruits), 308 F.2d 311
(D.C. Cir. 1963), vacated and remanded, 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
377 U.S. at 59-60.
Id. at 60-61. Customers were to be told that they were not asked to boycott the store, but
only the Washington State apples sold inside. Id.
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any problems arose.5" The pickets, who wore placards, patrolled
store fronts and distributed handbills which told consumers not to
purchase Washington State apples., The picketing remained peaceful, and no work stoppages or delivery interference resulted., 7
When the case was before the Board, it decided that the circumstances clearly indicated that the Fruit Packers Union did not
intend to cause any work stoppages and that the precautions taken by
the union showed no intent to violate section 8(b)(4)(i). Despite these
findings, the Board still concluded that the picketing violated section
8(b)(4)(ii). 5 The Board determined that such picketing necessarily
"'threaten[s], coerce[s], or restrain[s]' persons within the
meaning of
Section 8(b)(4)(ii)." 5 Further, the picketing was found to have an
illegal object since "[t]he natural and foreseeable result of such picketing, if successful, would be to force or require Safeway to reduce or
to discontinue altogether its purchases of such apples from the struck
employers."
The Board deemed it reasonable to infer that this was
the union's intent.6'
On a petition by the Board to enforce its cease and desist order,
a panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed the Board's decision.6" The appellate court acknowledged
that the legislative history cited by the Board "possesse[d] much
force" ' but reasoned nonetheless that, by the most plausible reading
of the words of the statute itself, only action that in fact threatened,
Id. For the full text of instructions to pickets and letters to store managers, see Appendix
to Tree Fruits. 377 U.S. at 73-76.
377 U.S. at 60 & n.3.
' Id. at 61. Employees could see the pickets through the store windows, and in some cases,
passed the strikers while entering through consumer entrances. Fruit & Vegetable Packers
Local 760 (Tree Fruits), 132 N.L.R.B. 1172, 1176 (1961). The Board previously had held that
this factor could unlawfully induce secondary employees. Laundry Workers Local 218, 127
N.L.R.B. 11, 14-16 (1960). Also, the Board had ruled that the picketing need not successfully
lead to a work stoppage; the requirement was simply that it induce or encourage one. United
Wholesale & Warehouse Employees Local 261, 125 N.L.R.B. 520, 524 (1959).
' Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760 (Tree Fruits), 132 N.L.R.B. 1172, 1177 (1961), rev'd
and remanded, Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760 v. NLRB, 308 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1963),
vacated and remanded, 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
" Id. at 1177.
' Id. The illegal object need not be the only object of the union, so long as it is an object.
E.g., NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 689 (1951); National
Maritime Union v. NLRB, 342 F.2d 538, 546 (2d Cir. 1965).
" Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760 (Tree Fruits), 132 N.L.R.B. 1172, 1177-78 (1961),
rev'd and remanded, Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760 v. NLRB, 308 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir.
1963), vacated and remanded, 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
12 Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760 v. NLRB, 308 F.2d 311, 318 (D.C. Cir. 1962),
vacated and remanded, 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
Id. at 315.
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coerced, or restrained by causing substantial economic injury would
be outlawed. 6" In rejecting the per se approach adopted by the
board, the court stated that the union appeal to one product among
many in the supermarket did not evidence substantial economic
injury.'
The Supreme Court granted certiorari,' in order to address the
secondary picketing question. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, stated that the Board's interpretation of the Act placed a "special
responsibility"67 on the Court to examine the legislative history.6s
This examination was to be conducted within a specific, narrow
framework, however, since Congress prohibited peaceful picketing
not in every case, but only to deal with " 'isolated evils which experience has established flow from such picketing.' "" Consequently,
the Court stated that it would not proscribe such picketing unless
"'there is the clearest indication in the legislative history,' . . . that
Congress intended to do so as regards the particular ends of the picketing under review.""
Justice Brennan concluded that the Board's per se approach was
incorrect. 7 The legislative history did not indicate, with the amount
of clarity demanded by the Court, a congressional intent to include
all secondary consumer picketing within the statutory prohibition.72
In the Court's view, the "isolated evil" to be avoided was the use of

rAId. at 314-15. Actual or potential substantial economic impact would show if coercion had
in fact occurred. Id. at 317, 318. Also, the court of appeals said that its interpretation of the Act
was necessitated by potential first amendment conflicts inherent in the Board's interpretation.
Id. at 316-17. The court further declared that free speech can be restricted by statutes which
attempt to restrict legislatively defined evils:
But in the absence of a showing that a substantial economic impact on the secondary employer has occurred or is likely to occur, we would be hard-put to find a
constitutional justification for prohibiting a union from using picketing as the form
of making 'do not patronize' appeals, so long as the picketing is conducted in an
entirely peaceful and non-coercive manner, is addressed solely to consumers, and
has no side effects which might be a basis for distinguishing it from any other form
of publicity.
Id. at 317.
6 Id. at 317-18.
- 374 U.S. 804 (1963).
67 377 U.S. at 62.
6'

Id.

6

377 U.S. at 63 (quoting NLRB v. Drivers Local Union, 362 U.S. 274, 284 (1960)).

7oid.

11377 U.S. at 63. The Court noted that the broad ban on all secondary picketing urged by
the Board would offend the free speech guarantee. Id.
" Id. at 63. The Court added that congressional intent was particularly unclear when the
peaceful picketing "islimited, as here, to persuading Safeway customers not to buy Washington
State apples when they traded in the Safeway stores." Id.
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union pressure to induce customers to cease all dealings with the
secondary employer in order to force him to apply pressure on the
primary employer. 3 Since the picketing in this case followed only
the struck product, the Court held that it was not the type of activity
that Congress intended to proscribe under section 8(b)(4).14 The
majority reasoned that when the picketing follows the struck product,
"the union's appeal is closely confined to the primary dispute."75
Accordingly, any effect on the secondary's business occurs "only because the public has diminished its purchases of the struck
product.""76 Had the purpose of the picketing instead been to persuade customers to totally stop trading with the secondary, the trading would not be the result "of a falling demand, but [a] response to
pressure designed to inflict injury on his business generally." 7 The
Tree Fruits Court also expressed a concern with constitutional problems because the per se prohibitive approach of the Board presented
"a broad ban against peaceful picketing [which] might collide with
the
guarantees of the first amendment." s
Justice Black's concurring opinion was specifically concerned
with these potential constitutional problems that might arise.79
Although the Justice disagreed with the view that the act was meant
to allow some types of secondary picketing, he nonetheless concurred
with the majority decision reasoning that a broad ban would violate
the free speech guarantee of the first amendment. 8
71 Id. The majority said that the Senate was primarily concerned with other problems in
labor relations, id.at 65, and when consumer picketing was discussed, it was only criticized
when used as pressure to persuade all customers to cease all business with the secondary. Id. at
65-66. Opponents of the amendments did believe that a ban on all consumer picketing was
being proposed, but the Court said " '[t]he fears and doubts of the opposition are no authoritative guide to the construction of legislation.' " Id. at 66 (quoting Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert
Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394 (1951)).
The Court decided that the House legislative history was "similarly beclouded," 377 U.S. at
67, but also reflected nothing more than a concern with secondary picketing used to force a
secondary to terminate all relations with the primary employer. Id. at 67-78.
The Court's use of legislative history in this case has been strongly criticized by commentators. See, e.g., Lewis, Consumer Picketing and the Court-The Questionable Yield of Tree
Fruits, 49 MINN. L. REV. 479, 484, 500-01 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Lewis].
74 377 U.S. at 71. Although the picketing may have been within the letter of the law, it was
not " 'within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.'" Id. at 72 (quoting Holy Trinity
Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)).
- 377 U.S. at 72.
76

Id.

"I id.
78 Id.
'7 Id.

at 63.

at 76 (Black, J., concurring).
' Id. Justice Black argued that even assuming that the non-speech aspects of picketing may
be regulated, see Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 464-65 (1950), section 8(b)(4) would
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Justice Harlan, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Stewart,
declared that the legislative history showed sufficient intent to ban all
secondary picketing." He noted that the Court's distinction between
pure product picketing and total business picketing was too refined to
be useful. In Justice Harlan's view, the very nature of picketing
would cause customers to avoid the struck premises; regardless of the
narrow scope of the pickets' appeal, unrelated business affairs of the
secondary employer would also be affected. 2 Justice Harlan predicted that the majority's fine distinction would prove even more
problematic when the struck product comprised a major portion of
the retailer's business."
Justice Harlan's concern over the potential problems in the application of the majority's rationale proved well founded. Indeed,
nearly the same fact situation he prophesied in Tree Fruits, occurred
in Local 14055, United Steelworkers v. NLRB (Dow Chemical Co.)."
In Dow Chemical Co., the union's secondary picketing occurred at
the premises of six retail gasoline stations which sold the struck product, Bay gasoline. The picket signs asked customers to refrain from
purchasing Bay gasoline. Although each station sold other items,
gasoline sales ranged from less than fifty percent of sales at one station to ninety-eight percent at another station. 5
A majority of the NLRB decided that the circumstances sufficiently distinguished this situation from Tree Fruits where the struck
product comprised only a minor portion of the supermarket's total

go beyond this by attempting to regulate the dissemination of information specifically recognized as legal by the publicity proviso. 377 U.S. at 77-79 (Black, J., concurring). The illegality
of the picketing, in Justice Black's view, would therefore turn on the content of the views
expressed and unfairly restrict the rights of one side in a labor dispute to inform the public. Id.
at 78-79 (Black, J., concurring).
" 377 U.S. at 92 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
82 Id. at 82-83 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The distinction between product and total business
picketing was recognized in the case law prior to the statute. See, e.g., 377 U.S. at 64 n.7;
Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y. 281, 11 N.E.2d 910 (1937). However, Justice Harlan pointed
out that the distinction is nowhere present in the legislative history of the Act. 377 U.S. at
83-84 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Indeed, Professor Archibald Cox, who played a major role in the
creation of the legislation, presented evidence that many legislators did not even comprehend
such a distinction. Cox, supra note 45, at 274.
' 377 U.S. at 83 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan believed it was within the power of
Congress to restrict secondary picketing because of possible undesirable effects, id. at 93-94
(Harlan, J., dissenting) especially since the publicity proviso left open other means of communication for unions. Id. at 93 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See notes 165-70 infra and accompanying text.
524 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded for a consideration of nootness
sub nom., Dow Chem. Co. v. Local 14055, United Steelworkers, 429 U.S. 807 (1976).
Id. at 855.
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sales and the impact of the picketing was minor. When the potential
impact could be severe, as in Dow Chemical Co., the Board stressed
that the predictable result of such picketing would be coercion of the
retailer to discontinue his relations with the supplier. Because of
these predictable results, the Board was able to conclude that the
87
picketing had an unlawful object.
On a petition for review, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia set aside the Board's cease and desist order." The court
determined that coercion was to be defined in light of Tree Fruits,
which held that picketing that followed the struck product was not
one of the "isolated evils" which Congress intended to prohibit.8 9
The appellate court gave recognition to the fact that economic consequences might be severe, however, it concluded that the legality of
peaceful product picketing could not rest solely upon possible economic effects. 9°
Concern for possible economic harm to a secondary employer
has also played a prominent role in the "merged product" cases.
These cases involve union attempts to picket a primary product that
is so integrated or "merged" into a secondary product that it is in
effect impossible for the customer to obey the union appeal to avoid
purchasing that primary product without affecting the independent
aspects of the secondary business."
I6Local 14055, United Steelworkers (Dow Chem. Co.), 211 N.L.R.B. 649, 651 (1974), application for enforcement denied, Local 14055, United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 524 F.2d 853
(D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded for a considerationof mootness sub nom., Dow Chem.
Co. v. Local 14055, United Steelworkers, 429 U.S. 807 (1976). See notes 51-83 supra and
accompanying text.
17 Local 14055, United Steelworkers (Dow Chem. Co.), 211 N.L.R.B. 649, 651, 651-52
(1974), applicationfor enforcement denied, Local 14055, United Steelworkers v. NLRB, vacated
and remanded sub noa., Dow Chem. Co. v. Local 14055, United Steelworkers, 429 U.S. 807
(1976). The Board noted that although some business aspects of the stations would be untouched, all of them would suffer some economic duress because of the predictability of the loss
of gasoline sales. Id.
s 524 F.2d at 861.
ld. at 859.
Is
IId. at 860. It was also noted that when Tree Fruits was before the court of appeals, the
substantial economic consequences test was used and subsequently rejected by the Supreme
Court. Id. at 585. In fact, in Tree Fruits the rejection of the court of appeals test was specifically limited to that case. 377 U.S. at 72-73.
Subsequently, the judgment of the court of appeals was vacated by the Supreme Court, and
the case was remanded to the lower court with directions to remand to the Board for a reconsideration in light of intervening circumstances. Dow Chem. Co. v. Local 14055, United Steelworkers, 429 U.S. 807 (1976). The case was then dismissed as moot by the NLRB, Local 14055,
United Steelworkers of America, 229 N.L.R.B. 302 (1977). The intervening circumstance was
the dissolution of the local union with whom the gas stations had their dispute. Petitioner's
Brief, supra note 5, at 5.
" See, e.g., Hoffman v. Cement Masons Local 337, 468 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973); American Bread Co. v. NLRB, 411 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1969);
Honolulu Typographical Union No. 37 v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 952 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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In Honolulu Typographical Union No. 37 v. NLRB,"2 the union
picketed restaurants that advertised in the primary employer's
newspaper. 3 When an unfair labor practices charge was filed, the
union attempted to rely on the "follow the product" rationale.' The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals disagreed, reasoning that the
Union could not solely follow the struck product, newspaper advertising, to a secondary situs because the product was so merged into the
secondary enterprise. 5 Therefore, the court determined that the
only realistic effect of the picketing was a total boycott of the secondary employer.9
In Safeco, the courts were once again faced with a related situation where the struck primary product made up a high percentage of
the business of the neutral secondary employer. Judge Robinson,
writing for the en banc majority, initially concurred with the Board's
finding below in Retail Store Employees Local 1001 (Safeco)," that
the land title companies were neutrals in the labor dispute between
Safeco and the Union " despite the fact that there was a high degree

401 F.2d 952 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
Id. at 954. One of the struck enterprises was a jewelry store. Id.
Id. at 955. The union argued that the intangibility of the advertising had no effect on the
fact that diners were consuming the struck primary product and therefore Tree Fruits gave it
the right to urge customers to avoid that product. In addition, the union argued that this right
should not be limited even though the advertising was reflected in everything the secondary
employer sold. Id.
Id. at 954-56.
Id. at 954, 956. The court also noted that this interpretation gave more protection to a
secondary who dealt with a merged product, but such a distinction was necessary because "the
law makes distinctions in terms of the traditions and economic realities of Union pressure, even
though this may result in differences not easily subject to logical delineation between the scope
and kinds of picketing available to unions in different labor circumstances." Id. at 955-56.
Although the language of the opinion stressed a "cease all dealings" approach, the court
specifically mentioned that it was not ruling on the question of a secondary employer who only
dealt with the struck product. Id. at 956 n.9.
' No. 76-2015 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 10, 1979) (en banc), rev'd, 100 S. Ct. 2372 (1980).
- 226 N.L.R.B. 754 (1976), enforced, Retail Store Employees Local 1001 v. NLRB, 99
L.R.R.M. 3330 (D.C. Cir. 1978), enforcement denied on rehearing en banc, No. 76-2015 (D.C.
Cir. Aug. 10, 1979), rev'd, 100 S. Ct. 2372 (1980).
No. 76-2015, slip op. at 9-10. The court noted that the Board had examined all of the
factors which it considered material. In making a determination of the question of neutrality,
the Board had considered the degree of common ownership, the amount of control over every
day operations, the extent of integration of the two businesses, and the degree to which the
secondary employer was dependent on the primary employer for a substantial porportion of its
business. Retail Store Employees Local 1001 (Safeco), 226 N.L.R.B. 754, 756 (1976). This four
part test developed from past situations where neutrality was found lacking. The determination
of neutrality is a threshold question in this area since a court will only protect a neutral in the
dispute. See notes 35-37 supra and accompanying text.
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of economic interdependence between Safeco and the title
companies." ° In light of the unique difficulties involved and Board
expertise in handling these problems, the court stressed that Board
findings in this area were entitled to considerable deference. 101
Following the Tree Fruits rationale, the en banc majority declared that the important factor to consider in an examination of the
challenged picketing was the scope of the union appeal, that is, the

The Board will also look for "such actual or active common control, as distinguished from
merely a potential, as to denote an appreciable integration of operations and management policies." Drivers Local No. 639 (Poole's Warehousing, Inc.), 158 N.L.R.B. 1281, 1286 (1966). The
facts cannot show that the employer is performing struck work, see NLRB v. Amalgamated
Lithographers, 309 F.2d 31, 37 (9th Cir. 1972) (loss of neutral status by performing work struck
employer would normally perform were it not for the strike), nor can the two employers be, in
actuality, one straight line operation. See In re National Union of Maritime Cooks & Stewards,
87 N.L.R.B. 56 (1949).
Mere economic dependence alone is not enough, Carpet Layers Local 419 v. NLRB, 467
F.2d 392, 400 (D.C. Cir. 1972), all four factors will be considered in determining the employer's status. 226 N.L.R.B. at 756. See NLRB v. Local 810, Steel Fabricators (Sid Harvey),
460 F.2d 1, 5-6 (2d Cir. 1972) (rejects mechanical application of integration on day-to-day operations test in favor of common sense evaluation of the relationship); Local 24, Int'l Bhd of Teamsters v. NLRB, 266 F.2d 675, 680 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (facts and circumstances will determine if
secondary deserves protection as a neutral).
The only fact which warranted a loss of the neutral status in the case of the land title
companies was the high degree of economic interdependence, however, in the Board's view,
that alone would not lead to a loss of neutrality. 226 N.L.R.B. at 756. It was estimated that
there was little potential for control by Safeco over the five companies. No showing of any
involvement in the day-to-day operations was made and no struck work was performed. Additionally, no employees were exchanged and no interference in the companies' labor policies was
found. Generally, the relationship did not show the degree of integration necessary to predicate
a loss of neutrality. Id.
" No. 76-2015, slip op. at 8-10. When the case was before the court of appeals, the union
stressed that the substantial economic interdependence between Safeco and the land title companies belied a finding of neutrality, Petitioner's Brief, supra note 5, at 25-27. The court of
appeals, however, had previously determined that economic dependence alone would not establish an ally relationship. Carpet Layers, Local 419 v. NLRB, 467 F.2d 392, 400-01 (D.C. Cir.
1972). Consequently, the court determined that the facts at bar showed "no more than the
functional integration of a title insurance underwriter and its policy-writing agencies, and the
economic dependence of those agencies." No. 76-2015, slip op. at 10.
No. 76-2015, slip op. at 8. The general rule applicable to the scope of judicial deference to
Board findings is codified in 29 U.S.C. § 160 (e) & (f) (1976), and was interpreted in Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). There, the Supreme Court lamented the high
degree of finality that some courts had been according NLRB findings. Id. at 490.
The Court has said that Board findings on the question of secondary picketing deserve
considerable deference.
Not only are the findings of the Board conclusive with respect to questions of
fact in this field when supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole,
but the Board's interpretation of the Act, and the Board's application of it in doubtful situations are entitled to weight.
NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 691-92 (1951).
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products to which the picketing was directed, and not the potential
economic consequences. 0
The court further determined that the correct test for a finding
of threatening, coercing, or restraining must be limited to an examination of whether the union picketing is aimed solely at the struck
product or whether its appeal is extended further into the general
business of the secondary employer. 1 3 Under the Safeco facts the en
banc majority decided that the picketing in question deserved protection reasoning that "there [was] no suggestion that it was structured
to affect anything but the struck insurance."10 In this instance, the
court refused to give the same deference to the NLRB finding of an
illegal objective on the part of the union as it had given to the
°5
Board's determination of neutrality.
Implicit in the court of appeals analysis was a concern for possible first amendment conflicts inherent in any attempt to restrict
peaceful picketing.' 6 By following a rule of construction which required that it avoid an interpretation of the statute that would present potential constitutional doubts, the court was compelled to adopt
its own interpretation of the Act. 07 It noted that "the Board's nebulous inferred-intent approach to [the Act's] operation enlivens the
specter of constitutional infirmity." 05
11No. 76-2015, slip op. at 25. The Board had also previously said that lawful picketing could
not be made unlawful because of potential economic consequences. Local 150, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 151 N.L.R.B. 734, 740 (1965).
10 No. 76-2015, slip op. at 22-23, 25. In following the struck product, it has been said that
the picketing is no more than "primary picketing at a secondary situs." Honolulu Typographical
Union No. 37 v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 952, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Any loss of business by the
secondary employer occurs only because the public cuts back on its purchases of the struck
product. No. 76-2015, slip op. at 21.
101No. 76-2015, slip op. at 23. Accordingly, the court held that union picketing did not
threaten, coerce, or restrain the land title companies within the meaning those terms were
given by the Supreme Court. Id. at 24.
101No. 76-2015, slip op. at 28. See notes 98-100 supra and accompanying text. This despite
its acknowledgement that it is " 'the primary function and responsibility of the Board to resolve
the conflicting interests that Congress has recognized in its Labor Legislation.' " Id. (quoting
NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 499 (1960)). See also St. John's Hosp. &
School of Nursing, Inc. v. NLRB, 557 F.2d 1368, 1372 (10th Cir. 1977) (court will not be
rubber stamp for Board decisions inconsistent with Congressional policy); NLRB v. International Union of United Brewery Workers, 272 F.2d 817, 820 (10th Cir. 1959). But see NLRB v.
Millmen & Cabinet Makers Union Local No. 550, 367 F.2d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 856 (1967).
106 No. 76-2015, slip op. at 29-30. The same concern was expressed in Judge Robinson's
dissent in the earlier panel opinion, Retail Store Employees Local 1001 v. NLRB, 99 L.R.R.M.
3330, 3341 (D.C. Cir. 1978), as well as in Dow Chem. Co., 524 F.2d at 860-61.
107 No. 76-2015, slip op. at 29-30. See also United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402
U.S. 363, 369 (1971) (Court will initially attempt to find statutory construction that avoids constitutional questions).
11 No. 76-2015, slip op. at 29-30 (footnote omitted). For further discussion of the first amendment issue, see notes 166-69 infra and accompanying text.
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Judge Robb vigorously challenged the majority's position in a
dissent he authored for four members of that court of appeals."0 He
emphasized the congressional objective of protecting the secondary
employer who is a neutral in the labor dispute and therefore powerless to protect himself from economic harm. " The judge pointed out
that in the Tree Fruits opinion the Supreme Court "repeatedly
stressed that section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) proscribes picketing which is intended to persuade the customers of a secondary employer to cease
dealing with him." "' Judge Robb noted that in Tree Fruits, the
picketed apples were a minor product in a multi-product supermarket, and at most, a successful strike could only have a minimal impact
on the Safeway supermarket. 12 Accordingly, he said that the "follow
the product" exception of Tree Fruits did not apply where the product comprised all or nearly all of the business of the secondary employer." 3
employer. "'

101No. 76-2015, dissenting slip op. at 1. (Robb, J., dissenting). In the earlier panel decision,
the majority opinion, authored by Judge Robb, agreed with the Board finding that the picketing
should not be protected by the Act. Retail Store Employees Local 1001 v. NLRB, 99 L.R.R.M.
3330, 3335 (D.C. Cir. 1978). They declared that nothing in the legislative history of the Act or
the Tree Fruits opinion precluded protection for a neutral employer when its business is comprised of the struck product. Id. at 3333. Indeed, it was noted that the Tree Fruits opinion
stressed that the union picketing could not attempt to coerce the secondary employer to cease
all dealings with the primary. Id.
...No. 76-2015, dissenting slip op. at 1 (Robb, J., dissenting). "I cannot believe that the
National Labor Relations Act permits such a sacrifice of helpless victims. I think Congress in
enacting section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) intended to forbid union appeals for a complete boycott of a neutral secondary employer." Id. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Cement Masons Union Local 337, 468 F.2d
1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973) (Congress determined that at one
product site, interests of neutral employer would prevail).
I" No. 76-2015, dissenting slip op. at 3 (Robb, J., dissenting). Therefore, the dissent decided
that predictable economic effects should play a part in the decision. Id.
12 No. 76-2015, dissenting slip op. at 4. Other cases have also ascribed a particular importance to the unique facts of Tree Fruits. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Cement Masons Union Local
337, 468 F.2d 1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973); NLRB v. Twin City
Carpenters, 422 F.2d 309, 314 (8th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Millmen & Cabinet Makers Union,
Local No. 550, 367 F.2d 953, 955 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied., 389 U.S. 856 (1967).
at 2 (Robb, J., dissenting). Other courts have held that
"3 No. 76-2015, dissenting slip op.
the probable effect of the picketing on the consumer is dispositive. See, e.g., Kaynard v. Independent Routemen's Ass'n, 479 F.2d 1070, 1073 (2d Cir. 1973); Hoffman v. Cement Masons
Union Local 1337, 468 F.2d 1187, 1192 (9th Cir. 1972). Additionally, Judge Robb took the
position that Board findings were entitled to considerable weight in this area since Congress
had primarily conferred upon the Board the power to balance the peculiar difficulties of national
labor policy. No. 76-2015, dissenting slip op. at 7. See notes 100 & 103 supra and accompanying text. Additionally, the dissent made reference to the merged product cases, No. 76-2015,
dissenting slip op. at 5-7 (Robb, J., dissenting), which have held that the Tree Fruits exception
would not apply when the picketing "attempt[s] to influence customers to completely cease all
transactions with the neutral employer." Hoffman v. Cement Masons Local 337, 468 F.2d 1187,
1190 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973). Judge Robb reasoned that, since the
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari,"' and in NLRB v. Retail
Store Employees Local 1001 (Safeco),"" reversed the court of appeals
and remanded the case with directions to enforce the NLRB
order. 1 6 Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion and readily
distinguished the multi-product Tree Fruits setting from the one product situation of the land title companies in Safeco."7 Since Safeco
insurance was substantially the only product sold by the land title
companies, consumers had no "realistic option other than to boycott
the title companies altogether."11' The Court determined that, even
though a successful primary strike might well have had the same
affect as the secondary picketing involved here," 19 the harm that
would have resulted was of the type which Congress intended to
prevent. 2 ' Furthermore, under these circumstances "picketing
would put the title companies to a choice between their survival and
the severance of their ties with Safeco, [which] plainly violates the
statutory ban on the coercion of neutrals" 121 which has as its object
the termination of the primary employer as supplier.
Viewing protection of neutrals as the ultimate goal of Congress,
Justice Powell reasoned that strict adherence to the "follow the product" approach of Tree Fruits would not provide adequate
protection. 2 2 In a multi-product setting, the harm from successful
product picketing will at most persuade the retailer "to reduce his
orders for the product or '. . .drop the item as a poor seller.' "123
The majority recognized that Tree Fruits was not concerned with
a one product secondary, who was a neutral in the labor dispute, and
emphasized that, although that case allowed picketing that followed

struck product was "co-extensive" with the business of the title companies, it could not be
followed without affecting the separate businesses of those companies. No. 76-2015, dissenting
slip op. at 4 (Robb, J., dissenting). From 90-95% of the income of the title companies came
from sales of the struck product, and the remainder from "ancillary" services. Id.
114 444 U.S. 1011 (1980).
"15100 S. Ct. 2372 (1980).
16 Id. at 2375, 2378.
"7 Id. at 2375-76.
"1 Id. at 2376. See notes 154-60 infra and accompanying text.
"9 100 S. Ct. at 2377 n.8.
...100 S. Ct. at 2377. The Court quoted Senator McClellan who said: "A merchant may have
built his business around the product, such as John Deere plows or some kind of machinery
from some other company. The merchant may have built up his trade entirely on that product."
Id. at 2377 n. 10.
2 Id. at 2377.
'
Id. at 2377 & n.8. For a discussion of the neutrality doctrine, see notes 98-99 supra and
accompanying text.
l1' 100 S. Ct. at 2376 (quoting Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 73).
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the struck product, picketing that shut off all trade with the neutral
would have to be distinguished. In Safeco, the "title companies [sold]
only the primary employer's product and perform[ed] the services
associated with it." 124 To permit picketing in such a case would allow
the union to expand the labor strife to include the entire business of
the neutral secondary since customers have no other alternative but
2
to avoid the secondary. 3
The Court made short shrift of the potential first amendment
conflict. Following the earlier determination that the picketing in
question encouraged an illegal boycott, the Court stated that prohibition of such picketing was in accord with both Tree Fruits and the
2 6
first amendment. 1
Both Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens concurred in the
majority opinion but expressed dismay over the "cursory" treatment
given the free speech issue. 121 Justice Blackmun repeated the concern expressed by Justice Black in Tree Fruits regarding speech restrictions based on content."
Expressing discomfort with the "content selectivity" approach to censorship, Justice Blackmun concurred
in the result because he respected the precarious balance Congress
attempted to strike between the rights of neutral employers and
aggrieved unions and was therefore unwilling to protect the union
picketing on constitutional grounds.'29
Justice Stevens argued that further examination of the governmental interests in question was necessary before the first amendment issue could be decided in favor of the secondary. 30 The Justice
focused on the effects that the patrolling aspects of picketing has on
the public because " 'the very presence of a picket line may induce
action of one kind or another, quite irrespective of the nature of the
ideas which are being disseminated.' "'31 It is these conduct elements of picketing in the labor context which differentiate it from
"A 100 S. Ct. at 2376. See notes 14-20 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the
relationship between Safeco and the land title companies.
"2.100 S. Ct. at 2376-77.

" Id. at 2378. The Court stated "Congress may prohibit secondary picketing calculated 'to
persuade the customers of the secondary employer to cease trading with him in order to force
him to cease dealing with or to put pressure upon the primary employer.' " Id. (quoting Tree
Fruits, 377 U.S. at 63). Congress could act on the non-communicative aspects inherent in
picketing. See notes 166-69 infra and accompanying text.
127 100 S. Ct. at 2378, 2379 (Blackmun, Stevens, JJ., concurring).
" See notes 79-80 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice Black's concurring
opinion in Tree Fruits. Justice Black's views were reinforced in Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92 (1972).
'2' 100 S. Ct. at 2378-79 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
130Id. at 2379 (Stevens, J., concurring).
"' 100 S. Ct. at 2379 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Bakery Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315
U.S. 769, 776-77 (1942)).
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pure speech.'32 Viewed in this light, Justice Stevens determined that
the statute was a narrowly drawn attempt to limit the compulsive
conduct features of picketing, and accordingly, found it to be a permissible restriction on speech."
The dissent was authored by Justice Brennan who was joined by
Justices Marshall and White.'
Justice Brennan began by stating that
the issue in "secondary site picketing cases is determining when the
pressure imposed by consumer picketing is illegitimate, and therefore
deemed to 'coerce' the secondary retailer." ' The dissent noted that
Tree Fruits distinguished picketing the primary employer's product
from picketing "goods originating from nonprimary sources." 136 Any
picketing of nonprimary source goods would result in coercion of a
secondary employer. 3 7 Justice Brennan found no reason to depart
from the distinction and insisted that the "follow the product" doctrine of Tree Fruits was the only viable test.'
A strict adherence to
the "follow the product" test therefore logically called for a rejection
of the majority's test. The dissent found no certainty in a test that
based its outcome "upon the extent of loss suffered by the secondary
firm through diminished purchase of the primary product."'
The
majority's test placed an onerous burden on the unions and substituted "a confusing and unsteady standard" in place of the Tree Fruits
"follow the product" test.'4 °
What presently remains in the secondary picketing situation in
light of Safeco is a struggle between the legitimate right of the union
to publicize its dispute with the primary employer and a right of the
secondary employer, who is a neutral in the labor dispute, to be free
of disruption of his business because of that dispute. 41 These two are
interrelated and may well compete with each other once the union

132 100

S. Ct. at 2379 (Stevens, J., concurring). See Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460,

465 (1950) & notes 166-70 supra and accompanying text.
3 100 S. Ct. at 2379 (Stevens, J., concurring).
' 100 S. Ct. at 379-82 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
100 S. Ct. at 2380 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. (emphasis in original).
ld. Justice Brennan gave four reasons why such picketing is violative of section 8(b)(4)(ii)
I3
(B). First, boycotting non-primary goods belies the strength of the primary dispute. Id.Second,
"a nonprimary boycott may unfairly impose multiple costs upon the secondary retailer." Id.
Third, the dispute becomes unnecessarily complex when the secondary employer is involved.
Id. Fourth, the disruptive effects are felt "by those businesses that manufacture and sell" the
nonprimary goods. Id.
" Id. at 2381 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
139 Id.

Id. at 2382 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
E.g., NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951).
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attempts to add pressure beyond that which results from a strike at
the primary site. They are reflected in the two interpretations of the
application of the Tree Fruits exception to section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) when
the struck product makes up all or nearly all of the sales of the
secondary employer.
The majority in Safeco was of the view that, according to both
the Act and the Tree Fruits opinion, the union had attempted to
persuade customers to cease all dealings with the neutral employer,
and therefore, the rights of the neutral must prevail." 2 The dissent,
Court had sided
on the other hand, determined that the Tree Fruits
3
with the union's right to appeal to the public."1
In essence, the ground work for this split had already been
formulated by the Court in the Tree Fruits opinion by its use of
ambiguous language which left the lower courts and the unions with
no clear guidelines to follow. 144 Clearly there was support in Tree
Fruits for both positions. The strong policy objectives at stake
together with the lack of clarity in the Act itself, made further widening of the split inevitable. Although the strict interpretation of the
Supreme Court's "follow the product" approach would permit the result posited by the Safeco dissent, it is not clear that such an interpretation was demanded.
In light of the similarity between the picketing carried out in
Safeco and an illegal secondary boycott, the Supreme Court essentially re-examined the legislative history and the policy objectives involved. In labor cases which demand important policy decisions, the
examination of legislative intent is a difficult but crucial task. In Tree
Fruits the Supreme Court demanded a high degree of clarity which

'4
"4

See notes 117-23 supra and accompanying text.
100 S. Ct. at 2379-82 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Dow Chem. Co., 524 F.2d at

859.
11 See Engle, supra note 8, at 197. While allowing such picketing when it follows the struck
product, the Supreme Court focused on the facts of that case. At times, the Court emphasized
the peculiar and limited nature of the facts before it, Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 63, but the exact
weight to be placed on them is unclear, because at other times it indicated a possibility for
expansion. Id. at 71. Many courts have focused on the facts of Tree Fruits in making their
decisions. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Cement Masons Local 337, 468 F.2d 1187, 1191 (9th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 41 U.S. 986 (1973); NLRB v. Twin City Carpenters, 422 F.2d 309, 314 (8th
Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Milimen & Cabinet Makers Union, Local 550, 367 F.2d 953, 955 (9th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 856 (1967). See also Comment, supra note 8, at 670 (Tree Fruits
decision interwoven with its facts-those facts are not helpful in subsequent cases). But see
Dow Chem. Co., 524 F.2d 853; Duerr, Developing a Standard for Secondary Consumer Picketing, 26 LAB. L.J. 585, 586 (1975).
In addition to the limited facts, the Court was also addressing the early approach of the
Board which had presumed that all secondary picketing was per se prohibited by the Act, 377
U.S. at 73. See also id. at 60.
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could not be found. The 1959 amendments were a product of extensive debate. Clarity was sacrificed to the compromise process and the
Supreme Court's strict demand for a clear expression of legislative
intent supporting a total ban could not be met, despite the fact that
many legislators had indeed believed that all secondary picketing
would be banned.'15 In Safeco the majority determined that the destruction of the neutral secondary enterprise was not a result which
Congress desired.'
The Safeco majority realized that the importance of a proper balance of policy objectives is clearly imperative in a setting where the
livelihood of the secondary employer could be destroyed by a successful strike. 147 Under the Safeco facts, the need to implement the
congressional desire to protect the neutral employer becomes more
pronounced in light of the potential for extreme harm where the
primary product accounts for all or nearly all of the secondary
In fact, there is little evidence that the legislators
enterprise.14
understood the distinction outlined by the Safeco dissent between
picketing the product and picketing the enterprise 149 and, thus, it is
unlikely that they intended that such a distinction be applied through
the Act.
In other cases, courts have considered economic consequences,"
and these consequences have been recommended by commentators
E.g., 105

REC. 6232 (1959) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey), reprinted in II NLRB
MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT, 1959, at
1037 (1959) [hereinafter cited as II LEG. HIST.]; Id. at 17720, (remarks of Sen. Kennedy),
reprinted in II LEG. HIST. 1388-89; Id. at 6666 (remarks of Sen. McClellan), reprinted in II
LEC. HisT. 1193. See The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 HAR'. L. REV. 143, 290 (1964). See
generally Lewis, supra note 73.
'
100 S. Ct. at 2377.
145

LEGISLATIVE

CONG.

HISTORY

OF THE LABOR

"4 A case where the struck product comprises all or nearly all of the neutral secondary employer's business presents a crucial opportunity for application of the protection afforded by the
Act.

[Ilf the union appeals for a total boycott, the neutral secondary employer's need for
the statute's protection becomes critical. Without the statute's protection, the
secondary employer is left completely helpless against the union, and the union has
the power to destroy the neutral's business. This result was not intended by Congress when it passed section 8(b)(4)(B).
Comment, supra note 8, at 667.
11 See, e.g., 105 CONG. REc. 6666 (1959) (remarks of Sen. McClellan), reprinted in II LEG.

HIsT., supra note 145, at 1193; Id. at 15532 (remarks of Congressman Griffin), reprinted in II
LEG. HIST., supra note 145, at 1568. See also Comment, Struck Product as Major Source of
Revenue, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 176, 18-88 (1976); Comment, supra note 8, at 666-67.
"I See Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 44
MINN. L. REV. 257, 274 (1959).
"0 E.g., NLRB v. International Bhd. of Electrical Workers Local 3, 317 F.2d 193, 199 (2d
Cir. 1963). See also Honolulu Typographical, 401 F.2d at 956 ("[T]he law makes distinctions in
terms of the tradition and economic realities of Union pressure"). Id.
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as a useful guide in determining union intent. 5 1 Consideration of the
economic consequences where the picketing follows the struck product but in actuality amounts to picketing of all or almost all of the
neutral's business, could logically fit within both the congressional
purpose and the Tree Fruits "cease all business" language. 152 Therefore, evaluation of economic effect was necessary to reach a true bal1
ance of the competing goals. 51
Additionally, part of the underlying rationale for the "follow the
product" test was an assumption that the harm which occurred to the
secondary employer was really very similar to that which took place
in connection with a successful primary strike."" This assumption
was based on the theory that the only loss to the secondary employer
would be a reduction in sales of the primary product caused by the
overall decreased consumer demand for that product similar to that
which occurs in a successful primary strike.'5 In a Tree Fruits limited product setting, where the customers could enter the store and
still make valuable use of their shopping time by purchasing other
products and still avoid purchasing the struck apples, much of the
effect may very well be analogous to a primary strike. In contrast,
there were probably very few customers who would have purchased
their title insurance in one store and returned to the picketed land
title company for a title search." The customer who wished to obey

151E.g., Heath, Secondary Consumer Picketing-The Product Boycott, 19 Sw. L.J. 567, 58183 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Heath].
152 See No. 76-2015, dissenting slip op. at 3. See also Heath, supra note 151, at 588 (looking
to language in Tree Fruits, supporters of 8(b)(4), and Act itself, secondary picketing that is in
effect a secondary boycott is unlawful); Comment, supra note 8, at 667-68.
" In striking a balance, an important consideration should be the actual historical rationale
behind the "follow the struck product" approach. The Supreme Court in Tree Fruits adopted
the common law distinction between product and total enterprise picketing developed chiefly in
New York around the 1930's. See, e.g., Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y. 281, 11 N.E.2d 910
(1937). See also Kovarsky, The Supreme Court and the Secondary Boycott, 16 LAB. L.J. 216
(1965).
Professor Kovarsky contends that the economic conditions and weak position of unions
during the depression era provided the justification for stressing the union's need to publicize
its dispute. Id. at 217-19. In applying the balancing approach today, the present economic
conditions and power of unions should be considered to determine whether these justifications
still exist. The change in conditions since the depression may well have eroded the basic
reasoning behind protecting the union's need to apply secondary pressure, especially in a situation similar to Safeco, where the neutral's need for protection is greater. See id. at 218-19.
" See Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 72.
5 Id. at 72. "[I1f the appeal succeeds, the secondary employer's purchases from the struck
firms are decreased only because the public has diminished its purchases of the struck product."
Id.
" "There is a great difference in impact where the public is asked to be selective among
products once inside the secondary's premises .. . and in asking them to completely refuse to
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the picketing would probably take his business elsewhere. This would
result in harmful effects on any non-picketed aspects of the secondary
enterprise. 157
The dissent in Safeco failed to consider the general coercive
effect of picketing on customers which is also more pronounced in a
sole or nearly sole product setting. Even if the union clearly identifies the struck product, the coercive nature of picketing will keep
many customers from entering the store.18 In a factual setting such
as Safeco, since there would be so little value in entering the land
title company with the intention of only dealing in the separate
aspects of the business, fewer people would be motivated to oppose
the coercive effect inherent in crossing a picket line. The effect of
such picketing on consumers has been used to determine whether
the union appeal calls for an illegal boycott of the secondary
employer. 1 9 In Safeco, as much as ninety-eight percent of the
secondary business involved sales of the struck product. Consequently, the limited choice left to the consumer in concert with the general
coercive effect of picketing, and the very high percentage of dealings
in the struck product render this, in effect, a "cease all business"
situation. "6
It is chiefly for this reason that merged product cases can provide a possible solution. In those cases, despite union "follow the
product" appeals, the picketing could not be legitimized, since it in
actuality requested union sympathizers to avoid the entire secondary
enterprise. " There is, of course, a difference between a product
which is merged into another so as to become indistinguishable and a
product which cannot be separated from the secondary business because it almost entirely makes up that business. The effect in the two
enter, or to cease all dealings with the secondary." Hoffman v. Cement Masons Union Local
337, 468 F.2d 1187, 1192 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973). See also Seafarers
Int'l Union v. NLRB, 265 F.2d 585, 591 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (pressure from picketing secondary
site different from primary strike).
157 This has been termed the signal effect. For a discussion of the signal effect of picketing,
see Heath, supra note 151, at 580; Comment, Secondary Consumer Picketing: Some Grafts on
Tree Fruits, 44 TUL. L. REv. 537, 538 n.7 (1970).
I" The Supreme Court has recognized the existence of this signal effect on the customers.
See, e.g., Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 464-65 (1950).
'9 See, e.g., Kaynard v. Independent Routemen's Ass'n, 479 F.2d 1070, 1073 (2d Cir. 1973);
Hoffman v. Cement Masons Union Local 337, 468 F.2d 1187, 1192 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973); NLRB v. Twin City Carpenters, 422 F.2d 309, 314 (8th Cir. 1970).
160 A mere facade of an appeal to consumers to avoid only the struck product does not preclude the courts from prohibiting what in reality is a secondary boycott. See NLRB v. Millmen
& Cabinet Makers Union, Local No. 550, 367 F.2d 953, 955-56 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 856 (1967).
"I' See, e.g., American Bread Co. v. NLRB, 411 F.2d 147, 154 (6th Cir. 1969).
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situations, however, is the same-the public is requested to cease all
business with the secondary. 6 ' The Supreme Court in Safeco has
therefore created a "merged business" exception to the Tree Fruits
doctrine. This new exception should apply to all situations where the
primary product is merged into the business of the secondary retailer. These situations violate the expressed policy of Congress and
the "cease all business" approach of Tree Fruits.
The merged product cases have been distinguished in terms of
the eventual market of the product.
It has been said that in such a
case, the primary product blends into the secondary product and "the
primary employer and the secondary retailer no longer deal in the
same product and share a common market." "

In other cases, the

product will keep its unique identity, thereby enabling the union to
follow it without any effect on the secondary employer's other business. While this does show the difference in the two situations, it
does not explain why that difference is significant when that product
makes up all or almost all of the livelihood of the secondary. The
importance of any difference pales when analyzed in terms of the
congressional intent and the Supreme Court's "cease all business"
language. For when the primary product constitutes all or almost all
of the secondary's business, the factual definition of "cease all business" is met."
Finally, there is the first amendment issue. There is always a
potential free speech problem when peaceful picketing is
regulated.'

The Supreme Court, however, has said that picketing

" The majority in the court of appeals en banc decision in Safeco argued that the separate
three to five percent of the title companies' business could be kept separate, and the union
made no appeal to affect them. No. 76-2015, slip op. at 26 n.93. The court did not specifically
say what the outcome would be if there were no separate aspects left. In Honolulu Typographical, the court of appeals had assumed that such a situation would be covered by the ally
doctrine. 401 F.2d at 956 n.9. Safeco shows this is not necessarily true since the secondary
employer was held to be a neutral despite the strong economic ties.
In the Third Circuit, the distinction may well be irrelevant. "At its extreme, if the sole
output of the secondary contains the product of the primary, the prospective purchaser may of
necessity cease patronizing the secondary altogether." K & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 592 F.2d
1228, 1232 (3d Cir. 1979). But see Safeco, 100 S. Ct. at 2381 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
163 The question was not specifically addressed by the court of appeals in Safeco because it
was not considered by the Board below. See note 13 supra. The Supreme Court in Safeco
indicated that the doctrine was applicable. 100 S. Ct. at 2376 & n.7.
No. 76-2015, slip op. at 26 n.93.
"s K & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 592 F.2d 1228, 1232 (3d Cir. 1979). The merged product
cases often use "cease all business" language when proscribing picketing of a merged product.
Id. at 1233; Hoffman v. Cement Masons Union Local 337, 468 F.2d 1187, 1192 (9th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973); NLRB v. Twin City Carpenters, 422 F.2d 309, 313 (8th Cir.
1970); American Bread Co. v. NLRB, 411 F.2d 147, 154 (6th Cir. 1969). The District of Columbia Circuit also used this language in Honolulu Typographical. 401 F.2d at 955-56.
16
See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
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involves patrolling as well as speech and "not being the equivalent of
speech as a matter of fact, it is not its inevitable legal equivalent." 167
Therefore, as the concurring Justices in Safeco recognized, picketing
can be regulated for a proper state or federal purpose. The protection
of a neutral employer has been cited as just such a proper purpose, 11
and the NLRA has been cited as an expression of congressional
policy. 169
In Safeco, only a ban on picketing a secondary who relied almost
totally on the struck product for his sales was at issue. The Court
found the union action in violation of the Act, and there seems to be
ample precedent to constitutionally defend such a decision.17°
The clearest value of the "follow the struck product" approach is
a readily distinguishable line between primary and non-primary product picketing, but does this value pass muster when weighed against
the congressional intent to protect the neutral? In Safeco there was a
new attempt to balance the competing interests at stake. The "follow
the product" approach appears to overly tip the balance in favor of
the union's right to appeal to the public. If that emphasis had not
been changed, a sophisticated union would have been able to follow
the struck product and still destroy a powerless neutral's business.
What is needed is an approach that gives consideration to both
sides.' 7 ' The inferred-intent test used by the NLRB in Tree Fruits
and the economic consequences test attempt to strike this balance,
but there are basic problems with their application.' 72 As the primary product increasingly encompasses a larger portion of the
11 Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 465 (1950). See also International Bhd. of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 705 (1951).
" Carpenters Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 726, 728 (1942).
'
International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 294 (1957).
70 See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 287-93
(1957); International Bhd. of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 705 (1951); K & K
Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 592 F.2d 1228, 1234 (3d Cir. 1979); Burr v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 612, 621
(5th Cir. 1963). See generally Comment, supra note 8, at 669; Comment, Secondary Consumer
Picketing: Some Grafts on Tree Fruits, 44 TUL. L. REv. 537, 540 n. 13 (1970). But cf. Police
Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). In Mosley, the Court held that legislation which discriminated among picketers in terms of the content of their message was invalid. Id. at 95. The
Mosley Court, by implication, may have lent authority to the views of Mr. Justice Black in Tree
Fruits. See id. at 98; notes 79-80 supra and accompanying text.
'"I The commentators have suggested a number of possible approaches to the problem. E.g.,
Engle, supra note 8, at 210-30 (primary object test); Lesnick, The Gravamen of the Secondary
Boycott, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1363, 1411-26 (1962) (pressure that is different in kind from that
which results from primary strike should be invalid); Comment, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments: Labor's Use of the Secondary Boycott, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 724, 767-68 (1960) (decisions
should be based on a balance of the equities).
172 See No. 76-2015, slip op. at 29-30 & n.104; Burr v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 612, 620-21 (5th Cir.
1963). There is a definite lack of clear guidelines for the unions to follow. At what point does
the harm become impermissible? What must be proven to show that harm occurred.
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secondary's business, the corresponding need for protection
increases. 73 Judge Robb expressed the development of this need in
terms of a target. 7 4 To extrapolate, as the percentage of the secondary enterprise becomes increasingly dependent on the struck primary product, this permissible target becomes part of another impermissible target, the neutral business. When these targets mesh, the
union should not be allowed to picket the neutral employer. In order
to fairly protect both interests, the courts and the Board will need
the power to determine at what point the targets intertwine to the
degree that the picketing becomes coercive. 7 ' This task may be difficult, and guidelines will have to be formulated, but it can and should
be done. The Tree Fruits opinion left many questions which concern
secondary picketing unanswered. Safeco illustrates that the courts
have been given certain new guidelines to follow. Without a clear
mandate from Congress that specific line drawing is required, the
Safeco Court made the fairest decision possible. After the Tree Fruits
multi-product setting, Safeco hammers out a starting point at the
opposite end of the spectrum where the primary product makes up
all or almost all of the struck product. While it is clear that the Board
and unions will have to struggle to find the working parameters here,
tasks such as these in the labor relations area were rightfully assigned
to the NLRB in the Act.
Thomas J. Kelly, Jr.

17 Comment, supra note 8, at 667.
'r
No. 76-2015, dissenting slip op. at 4. See generally Judge Robb's discussion of this topic in
his dissent in Safeco. No. 76-2015 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 10, 1979) (Robb, J., dissenting).
" Just as in the difficult area of determining neutrality, the NLRB is particularly suited for
such a task. See also notes 103 & 105 supra and accompanying text.

